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Within the past year numerous articles about the Department of Labor (DOL)
Fiduciary Rule have been published on popular business news websites. Headlines
such as Searcy Financial’s “The DOL’s Fiduciary Rule: Bad for Small Guy?”, NASDAQ’s
“The DOL Rule Isn’t Dead Yet”, and Forbes’s “Are Cosmic Fiduciary Powers Needed
For Your Best Interest?” have bombarded investors ever since the DOL Fiduciary Rule
(Fiduciary Rule) was announced. These articles have many people questioning whether
their advisors are acting in their best interest and, ultimately, who they can actually trust.
Since many investors do not know who they can and cannot trust, the DOL has taken
on the responsibility of ensuring that investors can feel more confident by requiring that
all financial advisors act as fiduciaries.
The Certified Financial Planner Board of Standards defines a fiduciary as “one
who acts with utmost good faith, in a manner he or she believes to be in the best
interest of the client” (Pasztor, 2017). There are over 200,000 financial advisors in the
United States alone (“Occupational Employment Statistics” 2018), but how many of
them uphold the fiduciary standard? Well, surveying every financial advisor or trying to
obtain statistics on the number of advisors who act as fiduciaries would be extremely
difficult. What is certain is that at least 80,960 people are certified by the Certified
Financial Planner (CFP) Board and hold the CFP designation (“CFP Professional
Demographics” 2018). Holding the CFP designation requires an individual to act as a
fiduciary when giving financial advice. This means that at least 80,960 people are
required to always act in the best interest of their clients, but who is enforcing this
standard?
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In the past there have been many attempts to regulate the financial services
industry in order to protect the client. Unfortunately, many advisors found ways around
these regulations. Advisors who failed to act in the best interest of their clients caused
many investors to question whether their trust in the financial services industry was
misplaced. In the interest of investors, the DOL has introduced and partially
implemented a rule requiring all financial advisors to act as fiduciaries when working
with retirement accounts. In an article from Forbes, author Jamie Hopkins stated that
this rule will be “disruptive to the financial services industry, for better or worse”
(Hopkins 2017). But which will it be?
The Fiduciary Rule “demands that retirement advisors act in the best interests of
their clients and put their clients’ best interests above their own” (Investopedia 2018).
Research shows that the Department of Labor Fiduciary Rule will change the financial
services industry in a positive manner because it will provide the client protection that
prior acts and rules have not, it will reinstall trust in the financial services industry, and it
will benefit the clients without significantly hurting the financial advisors.
Nonetheless, from the time the Fiduciary Rule was proposed by the Obama
Administration in 2010 it has faced significant pushback from both financial advisors and
certain elements in the federal government. In April of 2016 the Fiduciary Rule was
published in the Federal Register, stating that it would go into effect June 7, 2016 with a
delay applicability date of April 10, 2017. Throughout the following year, pushback
surrounding the rule increased under the Trump Administration. In February of 2017,
President Trump ordered the DOL to review their Fiduciary Rule again and prepare an
updated legal and economic analysis of the rule and the effects it could have on all
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parties. On March 3rd 2017, the DOL issued a proposed rule which called for a 60 day
delay to the April 10th applicability date. Seven days later, the DOL announced that it
would not enforce the Fiduciary Rule “in the near term”. On April 7th, 2017 the DOL
officially delayed the implementation of the rule from April 10 th, 2017 to June 9th, 2017.
Finally, on June 9th, 2017 the DOL Fiduciary Rule went into partial effect. The
requirement that all advisors uphold the fiduciary standard when working with retirement
accounts was delayed until January 2018. Starting in January of 2018, the Securities
Exchange Commission (SEC) has partnered with the DOL in order to speed up the
implementation of the remainder of the rule. The expected implementation date is now
June 2019, however it would not be unexpected to see it get pushed into 2020
(Investopedia 2018).
The Fiduciary Rule is not the first of its kind. Throughout the twentieth century a
number of acts and rules were put in place in attempts to protect clients in the financial
services industry. For example, “misrepresentation, fraud, and market manipulation in
the 1920s led to the Securities Exchange Acts of 1933 and 1934” (Pasztor, 2017). This
act was one of the first to regulate the stock market and the trading of secondary
securities in the United States (Pasztor, 2017). Later, in 1940 the Investment Advisers
Act “required advisors to act as a fiduciary when giving advice to their clients” (Pasztor,
2017). However, this was difficult to enforce because it still allowed advisors to collect
both fees and commissions. ERISA was enacted in 1974 in order to “protect employees
from underfunded and mismanaged pensions” (Pasztor, 2017). In 2010, the same year
that the Obama Administration proposed the Fiduciary Rule, the Financial Industry
Regulatory Authority (FINRA) promulgated Rule 2111 that requires an advisor or a firm
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to “have a reasonable basis to believe that a recommended transaction or investment
strategy involving a security or securities is suitable for the customer, based on the
information obtained through the reasonable diligence of the firm…” (“FINRA…” 2018).
This brought about the suitability rule that advisors must follow when they are not
working under the fiduciary standard.
There are three suitability obligations; reasonable-basis suitability, customerspecific suitability, and quantitative suitability. Reasonable-basis suitability “requires a
broker to have a reasonable basis to believe, based on reasonable diligence, that the
recommendation is suitable for at least some investors” (Kilbride 2018).The prior
diligence must give the advisor a generally good understanding of the potential
risk/reward of the recommended security or investment strategy. The Customer-specific
suitability “requires that a broker, based on a particular customer’s investment profile,
has a reasonable basis to believe that the recommendation is suitable for that
customer” (Kilbride 2018). In this obligation of suitability the broker must analyze many
customer specific factors to be able to support the claim that the investment is suitable
for their client. Lastly, quantitative suitability “requires a broker with actual or de facto
control over a customer’s account to have a reasonable basis for believing that a series
of recommended transactions, even if suitable when viewed in isolation, is not
excessive or unsuitable for the customer when taken together” (Kilbride 2018).
Overall, the suitability rule attempts to have financial advisors invest their clients’
assets in securities that will benefit the clients. However, there are many securities that
could be deemed “suitable” for a client based on their risk tolerance, but a security may
not be the best choice for the client if it has higher fees. However, under the suitability
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rule, advisors may put their clients’ money in a suitable security with higher fees to earn
a higher commission. In some situations, clients may want their money to be invested in
the security with a higher fee, but most of the time when advisors choose to put a
client’s money in a security with higher fees it is not in the client’s best interest (Kilbride
2018).
Many financial advisors work under the suitability rule rather than the fiduciary
standard. The difference between these two can be confusing for many clients. In fact,
in a 2017 study of 1,025 people over the age of 18, conducted by ORC International,
results showed that 53% of people thought that their financial advisor was already
required to act in the client’s best interest as a fiduciary. Today, financial advisors are
not legally required to act as a fiduciary at any time. Certain companies require their
employees to uphold a fiduciary standard, but it varies depending on the company and
what types of accounts they work with. Acting as a fiduciary is both a legal and ethical
duty in which the advisor must put the client’s interest ahead of their own (Kilbride
2018). If advisors work under the fiduciary standard, they are legally required to invest
their client’s money in the securities that are suitable for their accounts and also have
the lowest additional fees. In other words, the advisors are legally prohibited from
making trades that could potentially result in a higher commission for themselves or
their firm (Investopedia 2018).
The DOL is a major player in the attempt to further regulate the financial services
industry by expanding the definition of “investment advice fiduciary” under the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act, otherwise referred to as ERISA (DiCarlo, Hootkins
2017). Under ERISA and the Internal Revenue Code (the Code) not all advisors in the
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financial services industry qualify as fiduciaries, leaving many clients without proper
investment and financial advice. Those who qualified as fiduciaries were advisors who
were advising clients on a “regular basis”, which was defined as once a week. With that
definition of “regular” there were many client contracts that were not receiving advice
“regularly” and therefore the advisors working with those clients were not held to a
fiduciary standard (DiCarlo, Hootkins 2017). The Fiduciary Rule works to fix this
problem and cover many loopholes in previous acts. With the Fiduciary Rule in effect, it
will be harder for brokers to take advantage of their clients. The suitability rule allows
brokers and advisors to recommend options that could end up costing clients more,
resulting in higher profits for the broker or advisor, even if there were cheaper options
available. With all advisors being held to a fiduciary standard, they would be obliged to
invest their clients’ money in a cheaper equivalent, saving their clients money
(“Suitability” 2013).
The financial services industry will benefit from this additional regulation because
unethical advisors will not be able to use exceptions to the rules to increase their
personal profits. With the Fiduciary Rule, there is only one exemption; the Best Interest
Contract Exemption (BICE). Under the Fiduciary Rule, the only way that an advisor
would be allowed to not act in a client’s best interest is if the client signs a disclosure
agreement stating that the client was aware that the advisor was not going to act in the
client’s best interest (Investopedia 2018). This is new for the industry and will prove to
be beneficial once the Fiduciary Rule goes into full effect.
The Fiduciary Rule will also benefit the financial services industry by reinstalling
a fair amount of trust in it. Those in favor of implementing the Fiduciary Rule argue that
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“a client is dependent on the skill and integrity of a professional advisor” (Aikin, 2016).
Being assured that an advisor will always act in the client’s best interest would reverse a
trend of mistrust, and encourage investment. This is necessary, given that the level of
trust in the financial industry is currently relatively low. One of the main concerns in the
financial services industry is that financial advisors are not acting in the best interest of
their client in order to increase their commissions. For this reason, many clients do not
always trust their financial advisors. This lack of trust is economically inefficient and has
the potential to weaken the strength of a community. Many individuals believe that the
Fiduciary Rule is necessary in order to establish a difference between manufacturers
and distributors of financial products and financial advisors. At the moment there is a lot
of gray area in terms of who is selling a product and who is giving a client financial
advice (Aikin, 2016). There are also many clients who receive subpar advice from firms
that later are fined for unethical behavior (Pasztor, 2017).
In a study conducted by Harris Poll on behalf of McAdam in 2015 of over 2,000
U.S. adults, 71% of people said that some aspect of talking to a financial advisor scared
them. Of that 71%, 49% said that they were scared to talk to an advisor because it
would end up costing them a lot of money (Wanczyk 2015). Many Americans have a
fear of being taken advantage of by someone in the financial services industry and
according to this same survey, many of them are Millennials. While only 63% of
Americans age 45 or older were scared to talk to an advisor for fear of being taken
advantage of, a whopping 82% of Millennials were scared for the same reason
(Wanczyk 2015). This fear of talking to financial advisors has to come from somewhere.
One possibility is that the 2008 financial crisis installed a deep sense of fear of the
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financial industry in Americans. Over the past 10 years some faith has been restored in
the U.S. financial industry, but the ’08 crisis could be a subconscious reason why
Millennials are reluctant to talk to financial advisors (Wanczyk 2015). Another possibility
is that scandals surrounding the financial services industry have installed fear in
American investors. It is no secret that there are financial advisors who take advantage
of their clients, but there are plenty of financial advisors who do not and suffer from this
stereotype. Exhibit 1 shows the percentage of firms, out of 44 of the largest firms
measured by assets under management (AUM), that allow their employees to receive
commissions and the percentage of firms that do not.
Exhibit 1:

Firms that Take Commissions

43.18%
56.82%

Commission

No Commission

In this chart it is shown that 56.82% of firms allow their employees to receive
commissions while 43.18% do not. Over half of these firms allow their employees to
earn commissions, which could directly influence which products and securities they sell
to their clients. If an advisor is not held to the fiduciary standard and has the option to
Hawkes 9

sell a client a financial product at a higher price and in turn take home more money,
then they may do so. This is one of the reasons why clients have lost trust in the
financial services industry and why the Fiduciary Rule is necessary.
One way to reinstall trust in the financial services industry would be to require all
financial advisors to act as fiduciaries, especially when working with retirement
accounts. When surveyed, 99% of wealthy investors ranked “honesty and
trustworthiness” as most important out of all the criteria when selecting a financial
advisor (Elliott 2013). While 99% of respondents to this particular survey believe that
honesty and trust are the most important factors, there are individuals who do not know
how to pick out a dishonest or untrustworthy financial advisor from the rest.
When choosing a financial advisor, clients who do not understand certain
financial terms are at risk of having their advisor take advantage of them. Results from a
2017 survey of 1,025 adults conducted by ORC International showed that 61% of adults
do not know what it means for a financial advisor to be a fiduciary and 38% of adults
who work with a financial advisor do not know if their advisor is a fiduciary (”In Whose
Best Interest?” 2018). Individuals who are not well informed are at a higher risk of being
taken advantage of by their financial advisor (Elliott 2013). To avoid this, financial
advisors should be required to make decisions that are in the best interest of their
clients. In addition, if financial advisors acted as fiduciaries, the industry would gain
more clients. In a Personal Capital survey, 54% of people said they did not use a
financial advisor and of that 54%, 45% said it was because they did not trust them
(Fischer 2016). If the DOL Fiduciary Rule went into full effect and all financial advisors
were required to act as fiduciaries then there would be an increase in the amount of
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Americans who use financial advisors because they would then have a reason to trust
their advisor.
The Fiduciary Rule has been a controversial topic since it was first announced.
There are many individuals who are opposed to this rule being fully implemented
because they believe that it will decrease advisors’ salaries, causing advisors to leave
their jobs because the amount that they will be paid will not be worth the amount of work
they have to do to keep up their clientele. If advisors leave the industry, this will leave
clients without financial advice. The clients that will most likely be hurt by this are the
low income families and those who have less than $250,000 to invest. Due to the fact
that advisors will become scarce and advice will cost more, fewer advisors would want
to take on clients who will not generate as much income. Other clients could also be
priced out of working with a financial advisor. As the cost of giving advice increases, the
cost of receiving advice also increases. The amount that some advisors will charge in
flat-fees will increase to make up for the commissions that they are no longer allowed to
receive. While this is on a case by case basis, many firms operate on a commission
based model may have to restructure.
While this is one reason why some oppose the Fiduciary Rule, it should not be a
concern. Exhibit 2 shows the percentage of firms that require their employees to act as
fiduciaries when working with retirement accounts.
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Exhibit 2:

Firms That Let Employees Earn Commission

21.05%

52.63%
26.32%

Fiduciary

Not Fiduciary

Sometimes Fiduciary

This chart explains that 68.18% of firms already require their employees to act as
fiduciaries, 18.18% of firms sometimes require their employees to act as fiduciaries, and
13.64% of firms do not require their employees to act as fiduciaries. In addition, Exhibit
3 shows that the top 5 largest firms (Bank of America, Morgan Stanley, J.P. Morgan,
Wells Fargo, and UBS Wealth Management) make up 62.82% of the sample’s AUM
while the other 35 firms make up only 37.18% of the total AUM.
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Exhibit 3:

Firms Currently Acting as Fiduciaries

18.18%

13.64%
68.18%

Fiduciary

Not Fiduciary

Sometimes Fiduciary

Three out of these four largest wealth management firms (excluding Bank of America)
do not allow their employees to earn commissions and on top of that, only one of these
four firms does not require their advisors to uphold the fiduciary standard. Looking at the
Bank of America Merrill Lynch branches, three out of the five branches allow employees
to receive commissions while four out of the five branches require their advisors to
uphold the fiduciary standard.
These data show that many firms have already made changes to their fee and
compensation structure in anticipation of the Fiduciary Rule. If many firms have already
made these changes then, in theory, the implementation of the Fiduciary Rule will have
no effect on them. This rule will benefit the clients greatly and will not hurt advisors who
already act ethically and charge their clients upfront fees. Those who claim to see a
negative effect from the implementation of the Fiduciary Rule are generally those who
would prefer to push their company’s products or who would prefer to operate without
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ethical boundaries. In either case, those are advisors that informed clients would not
want to work with.
A similar fiduciary standard was implemented in Australia, India, the United
Kingdom, and the Netherlands. After those countries banned commissions on open-end
mutual funds, they each saw a decline of between 10 and 30 percent in the number of
financial advisors in their respective countries (Pasztor 2017). Some fear that if the
United States follows in these countries’ footsteps, it will also experience a decrease in
the number of financial advisors available. However, the exits from the financial services
industries abroad were mainly attributed to individuals who collected commissions and
were primarily sales-focused as opposed to advice-focused leaving the industry
(Pasztor, 2017). Financial advisors who are advice-focused rather than sales-focused
may have to change their method of compensation or the way in which they charge their
clients; but it may not affect them to the point that they leave the industry as a whole. If
the industry slowly makes a shift towards the fiduciary standard, then the
implementation of the Fiduciary Rule will not have an adverse effect on the majority of
companies.
In conclusion, the implementation of the Fiduciary Rule would benefit the industry
as a whole because it will provide clients with the protection they need, it will make
clients trust industry professionals, and it will benefit the client without harming the
advisors. This rule has been necessary from an ethical standpoint since advisors began
to abuse the suitability rule. In addition to protecting clients, the Fiduciary Rule has the
potential to reinstate trust in the financial services industry and increase the numbers of
clients who want to work with advisors. This will happen once investors understand that
Hawkes 14

every advisor has the obligation under the fiduciary standard to work in their best
interest. Lastly, the Fiduciary Rule will not have a negative impact on financial advisors
as a whole because many of them already uphold the fiduciary standard. Over half of
the firms that were part of this study already require their financial advisors to act as
fiduciaries, so this rule will not change how their clients are charged or how the advisors
are compensated. While slightly over half of the firms studied allow their employees to
earn commissions, a majority are allowed to take commissions from their product sales
only if it truly is in the best interest of the client. Overall, implementation of the Fiduciary
Rule would be in investors’ best interests; and those advisors who suffer from
implementation are likely not the most trustworthy advisors.
Since the Fiduciary Rule has not been fully implemented, it’s full impact is
unknown as of yet. Will investors become more confident? Will they place greater trust
in advisors? Will there be a decrease in the number of financial advisors in the United
States? Will firms change their methods of compensation, increase the fees that their
clients pay, or decrease the number of clients that they work with? Will the Rule have an
adverse effect on financial advisors and their firms (i.e. increasing a firm’s costs or
seeing a mass exit of financial advisors due to decreased salaries)? Although this
research leads one to believe that the industry will not see drastic changes, we will have
the answers to these questions only if the Rule is entirely implemented and when it
goes into full effect.
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